Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau Of Investigation

About the Author

Tessa Dinny Kurien is an LL.M. candidate at the Department of Law, Central University of Kerala, with an interest in legal research and contemporary developments in law.

(2024 INSC 687)

Bench: Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. (separate opinions; concurring on bail)

Facts

Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation1 asks whether an agency that has waited almost two years may arrest a person at the moment he is about to be released in a parallel case, and whether the reason for that timing matters in law. The Supreme Court divided on legality and agreed on bail. This comment argues that the more lasting contribution of the case lies in the opinion that did not carry the day on legality.

On 17 August 2022, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered a first information report on the Delhi Excise Policy for 2021 to 2022 under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and sections 120B and 477A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.2 Five days later, the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) recorded an enforcement case information report under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), treating the CBI offences as predicate offences.3 Mr Kejriwal, then Chief Minister of Delhi, was not named in the FIR. He appeared on 16 April 2023 under a summons under section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and was questioned for nine to ten hours.4 Four chargesheets followed without naming him as an accused.5

On 21 March 2024 the ED arrested him under section 19 of the PMLA.6 The Supreme Court granted interim bail on 10 May 2024 for the general elections, and he returned to custody on 2 June.7 On 20 June the Special Judge granted him regular bail in the ED case. The Delhi High Court stayed that order on 21 June and passed a reasoned stay order on 25 June.8

The CBI then acted. On 24 June, while Mr Kejriwal was in judicial custody in Tihar Jail, it applied to the Special Judge for leave to interrogate him, and leave was given. It questioned him in jail on 25 June and then obtained permission to arrest him and production warrants. On 26 June he was produced before the Special Judge, formally arrested and remanded to CBI custody.9 He was still not an accused; the CBI named him for the first time in its fifth chargesheet of 29 July 2024.10 On 12 July 2024 the Supreme Court granted him interim bail in the ED case and referred questions on the “need and necessity” of arrest under section 19 of the PMLA to a larger bench,11 so the CBI arrest alone kept him in prison. On 5 August 2024 the High Court upheld the arrest and, without deciding the merits, sent him to the Special Judge for regular bail.12

Legal Provisions

Article 21 protects life and personal liberty against any procedure that is not fair, just and reasonable.13 Arrest is the most direct way the State touches that liberty, and the CrPC turns the principle into rules.

Section 41(1)(b) governs arrest by the police without a warrant for cognizable offences punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years. The officer must also be satisfied that arrest is necessary for one of five stated purposes, such as proper investigation, preventing tampering with evidence or threats to witnesses, or securing presence before the court, and must record reasons in writing.14 Section 41A is the companion provision: where arrest is not required, the officer issues a notice of appearance, and a person who complies is not to be arrested unless the officer records reasons.15

Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar gave these provisions practical force by asking officers to ask themselves “why arrest?” and magistrates to examine the officer’s satisfaction before authorising detention.16 Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.17 had earlier separated the power to arrest from its justification. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI18 repeated these directions and treated non compliance as a ground for bail.

Section 439 of the CrPC gives the High Court and the Court of Session concurrent power to grant bail. Its exercise rests on the settled idea that bail is the rule and jail the exception.19 Courts ask the triple test: is the accused likely to flee, tamper with evidence or influence witnesses. Where a trial will take a long time, Article 21 can override even a statutory bar on bail, as the Supreme Court held in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb20 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Core Legal Issues

The Court framed three questions: whether the arrest was illegal and, if so, whether he should be released even without a bail application; whether he was entitled to regular bail regardless; and whether the filing of a chargesheet was such a change in circumstances that he should go back to the trial court.

Three narrower problems sit beneath these. First, what does section 41A require when the person is already in judicial custody in another case and cannot choose whether to appear? Second, when a court orders custody in one case and the person is then arrested in another, who decides whether the second arrest is necessary: the officer or the court? Third, which parameters govern bail, and may a High Court that has heard a concurrent bail application send the applicant back to the trial court?

Ratio Decidendi

The Split Verdict

A. Justice Surya Kant: arrest valid in form

On section 41A, Surya Kant J. began from the text. The provision says nothing about a person already in judicial custody. The court is in a sense the guardian of such a person, so the only way to secure his presence for questioning in another case is to seek the court’s permission. A notice sent through the jail superintendent, he added, would let the police arrest an undertrial in a fresh case without the knowledge of the court that had placed him in custody. Court permission brings judicial scrutiny of the need for custodial interrogation, so the order satisfied the purpose of section 41A.

On section 41A(3), he held that the CBI’s application of 25 June 2024 recorded its reasons, namely evasive answers and the need for custodial interrogation, and that the arrest memo summarised them. Arrest of a person already in custody is permissible, in the same case or another. Section 41(1)(b)(ii) was sound as a statement of law but did not apply. Once a court had applied its mind and issued production warrants, the arresting officer had no occasion to form an opinion of his own, since section 41(1) opens with the words “without an order from a Magistrate”. He found no procedural infirmity, but he confined his analysis to whether the CBI followed the correct procedure. He did not examine why the CBI acted when it did.

B. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan: necessity and timing

Bhuyan J. agreed that bail must be granted but wrote separately on the necessity and timing of the arrest. He began with the calendar. The CBI had not found it necessary to arrest Mr Kejriwal for over 22 months and became active only after the Special Judge granted regular bail in the ED case. In those circumstances, he said, a view may be taken that the arrest was perhaps only to frustrate that bail.

He then took the stated grounds apart. The CBI said Mr Kejriwal had been evasive and uncooperative. Bhuyan J. answered that an accused is not uncooperative merely because he does not answer as the agency would like, and he invoked the protection against self-incrimination in Article 20(3), including the right to remain silent. Relying on Joginder Kumar, he stressed that the power to arrest is one thing and the need to arrest another.  He deliberately did not enter into the semantics of sections 41(1)(b)(ii) and 41A, and concluded that the belated arrest was unjustified and continued incarceration untenable.

The opinion closes with institutional remarks. Investigation must seem fair as well as be fair, and the CBI must dispel the notion that it is a caged parrot and be seen as an uncaged one. Two clarifications help. The phrase “insurance arrest” was counsel’s description of the arrest and does not appear in the opinion. And Bhuyan J. did not hold the arrest illegal; he held it unjustified. The Court’s joint order dismisses the appeal on legality, so Surya Kant J.’s reasoning is the operative holding.

C. The unanimous ruling on bail

On bail the two judges spoke as one. Surya Kant J. held that although the arrest was procedurally lawful, a long period of incarceration before trial would infringe Article 21. With seventeen accused, 224 cited witnesses and extensive records, the trial was unlikely to end soon. The CBI already held the material, which met the fear of tampering, and his position and roots in society met the fear of flight. Any attempt to influence witnesses would be a misuse of bail. The triple test was satisfied.

On forum, Surya Kant J. accepted that an accused should ordinarily approach the trial court first, but said that a High Court should send the matter back at the threshold. Having heard the parties on notice, it should not move a bail claim between courts on procedural technicalities.  Bhuyan J. was sharper. The High Court’s order, though phrased as a favour to the applicant, prolonged his incarceration. Sending a man who had already been through the bail process in the ED case back through the trial court, the High Court and the Supreme Court would be a case of procedure triumphing over the cause of justice. He recalled Manish Sisodia, which warned against making an applicant play snake and ladder.21

Bail was granted on a bond of Rs. 10,00,000 with two sureties. Mr Kejriwal may not comment publicly on the merits, must attend every hearing, and remains bound by the ED case conditions. Bhuyan J. recorded serious reservations about the ED conditions barring him from the Chief Minister’s office and from signing files, but left them alone out of judicial discipline.

Critical Analysis

The route to legality has a weak point. Surya Kant J. treats the Trial Court’s permission as a replacement for the officer’s own satisfaction under section 41(1)(b)(ii). The logic is respectable, because a judge is a better check than a police officer. But the safeguard works only if the judge asks hard questions, and here the court acted on the agency’s own application, whose main reason was evasive answers. Bhuyan J. shows why that reason is thin. If court permission closes the inquiry, the reasoning turns circular: the agency asks, the court approves, and the statutory test is treated as met. Arnesh Kumar wanted magistrates to scrutinise detention, not merely to endorse it.22

The case exposes a gap. Nothing in the CrPC limits successive arrests by different agencies on overlapping facts, and section 41A, as read here, drops out once the person is in custody. The provision designed to slow down arrest is unavailable to the person most exposed to repeated arrest. Bhuyan J. supplies a missing test, which asks why now: what changed between August 2022 and June 2024, and whether the timing follows the accused’s chance of release rather than the needs of the investigation. That test is persuasive but not binding on legality. Courts hearing applications to interrogate or arrest a person in custody could adopt it as practice and ask the agency to explain the timing.

Neither opinion refers to international law, but the link is natural. Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and Article 9(3) provides that detention of persons awaiting trial shall not be the general rule.23 The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 35 adds that courts must test whether alternatives such as bail would make detention unnecessary, and that detention should not rest on the potential sentence.24 Indian courts have referred to the Covenant when giving content to Article 21, though it is not enforceable as such.25

Bhuyan J.’s necessity test, and his insistence that the process leading to and including the trial must not become the punishment itself, sit comfortably with that standard. A caution is in order: Mr Kejriwal reached the Supreme Court within weeks, while an ordinary undertrial rarely has that access, and these protections matter most for those who do not.

Conclusion

Kejriwal lays down two propositions and issues one warning. The propositions are that section 41A does not require a notice for a person already in judicial custody so long as the court’s permission is sought, and that a High Court that has heard a section 439 application on notice should decide it rather than send the applicant back. The warning, from Bhuyan J., is that a lawful arrest can still be unjustified when its timing suggests an aim to defeat a court’s order. For agencies, the lesson is to keep a record that explains why arrest became necessary at a particular moment and not earlier. For defence lawyers, the case adds an argument from timing and good faith beside the argument from form.

The law has also moved. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the CrPC from 1 July 2024, carries forward the notice of appearance scheme in section 35, while this arrest, made on 26 June 2024, fell under the older Code.26 Whether the reasoning on judicial custody will carry over and how the larger bench will read the need and necessity of arrest under the PMLA remains open. Until then, accountability depends less on the paperwork than on whether the agency can explain, in plain terms, why it acted when it did.

Footnotes

  1. Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 INSC 687, Criminal Appeal Nos. 3816 and 3817 of 2024 (SC, 13 September 2024) (hereafter Kejriwal). The judgment contains two separately numbered opinions, cited below as Surya Kant J. and Bhuyan J. with paragraph numbers. ↩︎
  2. Kejriwal (Surya Kant J.), para 3.2; (Bhuyan J.), para 3.1. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act 49 of 1988), s. 7; Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 120B, 477A. ↩︎
  3. Kejriwal (Bhuyan J.), para 4. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (Act 15 of 2003). ↩︎
  4. Kejriwal (Bhuyan J.), para 3.2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974), s. 160. ↩︎
  5. Kejriwal (Bhuyan J.), paras 3.3, 15. ↩︎
  6. Kejriwal (Surya Kant J.), para 3.3; (Bhuyan J.), para 5. ↩︎
  7. Kejriwal (Surya Kant J.), para 3.3; (Bhuyan J.), para 7. ↩︎
  8. Kejriwal (Surya Kant J.), para 3.4; (Bhuyan J.), para 8. ↩︎
  9. Kejriwal (Surya Kant J.), paras 3.5, 3.6; (Bhuyan J.), paras 9 to 11. ↩︎
  10. Kejriwal (Bhuyan J.), paras 13, 20, 22. ↩︎
  11. Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 2493 of 2024 (SC, 12 July 2024); Kejriwal (Bhuyan J.), paras 12, 12.1. ↩︎
  12. Kejriwal (Surya Kant J.), paras 3.8 to 3.10. ↩︎
  13. Constitution of India, 1950, art. 21; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248. ↩︎
  14. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 41(1)(b)(i) and (ii); the text is reproduced in Kejriwal (Surya Kant J.), para 31. ↩︎
  15. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 41A(1) to (4), inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009). ↩︎
  16. (2014) 8 SCC 273, paras 7.3, 11 ↩︎
  17. (1994) 4 SCC 260, para 20. ↩︎
  18. (2022) 10 SCC 51. ↩︎
  19. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 439; State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, AIR 1977 SC 2447; Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240. ↩︎
  20. (2021) 3 SCC 713. ↩︎
  21. Manish Sisodia v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Appeal No. 3296 of 2024 (SC, 9 August 2024), para 32. ↩︎
  22. (2014) 8 SCC 273, para 11. ↩︎
  23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 9(1), (3). India acceded on 10 April 1979. ↩︎
  24. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014), para 38. ↩︎
  25. Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360. ↩︎
  26. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act 46 of 2023), s. 35. ↩︎