MIHIR RAJESH SHAH V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Tessa Dinny Kurien is an LL.M. candidate at the Department of Law, Central University of Kerala, with an interest in legal research and contemporary developments in law.

(2025 INSC 1295)

Bench: B.R. Gavai, C.J.I., and Augustine George Masih, J.

FACTS

For more than a decade, the Supreme Court has been reshaping the law of arrest, but until recently the reform was uneven. Special statutes such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) attracted a demanding standard of communication of the grounds of arrest, while ordinary offences continued to be governed by a looser practice in which an oral explanation, recorded in an arrest memo or panchnama, was treated as sufficient. Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2025 INSC 1295, removes that distinction. The Court holds that the requirement of written grounds of arrest flows directly from Article 22(1) of the Constitution and therefore binds the police in every criminal arrest, whatever the penal statute invoked.1

The facts arise from the Worli hit-and-run incident in Mumbai on 7 July 2024. A speeding luxury car struck a two-wheeler. A woman was dragged along the road and died, and her husband was seriously injured. C.R. No. 378 of 2024 was registered at Worli Police Station under Sections 105, 125(b), 238, 281 and 324(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), together with Sections 134(A), 134(B), 184 and 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.2 The driver, Mihir Rajesh Shah, left the scene and was later apprehended.

The police completed an arrest form and asserted that the grounds of arrest and the arrestee’s legal rights had been explained orally in the presence of panchas. Shah was then produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate, who authorised custody under Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).3 He challenged the arrest and the remand orders in a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, contending that no written grounds had been given to him at or after arrest, or before he was produced for remand. The High Court dismissed the petition. It reasoned that the gravity of the offence, the arrest panchnama and the oral explanation together satisfied Section 47 BNSS and Article 22(1). On special leave, the Supreme Court framed the central question: does oral communication of the grounds of arrest satisfy Article 22(1), or must the grounds be furnished in writing in every case, irrespective of the penal statute?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

A. Article 22(1) of the Constitution

Article 22(1) provides that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall such a person be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.4 The provision contains two linked guarantees. The first is information; the second is effective legal assistance. The second cannot operate without the first, because counsel cannot advise on bail, resist remand or plan a defence unless the arrestee can tell counsel precisely why he has been arrested. The Court’s reasoning treats the right to information as the foundation on which the right to counsel rests.

B. Section 47 BNSS (formerly Section 50 CrPC)

Section 47(1) BNSS requires a police officer or other person arresting without a warrant to communicate forthwith the full particulars of the offence for which the person is arrested or other grounds for the arrest. Section 47(2) adds that, where the arrest is for a bailable offence, the arrestee must be told that he is entitled to be released on bail.5 The text uses the word “communicate” and does not say “in writing”. That textual silence was the foundation of the State’s argument and of the High Court’s approach. The Supreme Court answered it by reading the section as the statutory expression of Article 22(1), so that its content is fixed by the constitutional guarantee and not by the narrowest available reading of the word chosen by the legislature.

C. Section 187 BNSS (formerly Section 167 CrPC)

Section 187 BNSS governs the situation in which investigation cannot be completed within twenty-four hours of arrest. The accused must be produced before a Magistrate, who may authorise detention in police or judicial custody. This is a judicial function and not an administrative formality. A magistrate can apply his mind to the necessity of custody only if the accused is in a position to oppose the application through counsel, and the accused can do that only if he knows the grounds on which he was arrested. The provision therefore operates as the point at which the failure to give written grounds becomes visible and consequential.6

RELEVANT CASE LAWS

A. Custodial safeguards before 2023

The modern law of arrest begins with D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416, which required an arrest memo attested by a witness and notice to a relative or friend of the arrestee7. D.K. Basu addressed custodial abuse and transparency, but it did not require that the grounds of arrest be given to the arrestee in writing. In practice, courts accepted oral communication, or a diary entry stating that grounds had been explained, as compliance with Section 50 CrPC.

B. Pankaj Bansal: the PMLA

The turning point was Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024) 7 SCC 576, concerning Section 19(1) PMLA, which obliges the arresting officer to inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest. The Court held that this obligation is met only when the grounds are furnished in writing. It gave three reasons: oral communication invites a dispute about what was actually said; a person in the distress of arrest cannot be expected to absorb and retain detailed allegations; and a written statement is indispensable if the arrestee is to consult counsel and seek bail. The Court tied the rule to Article 22(1) and not merely to the statute, which is the doctrinal move that later made extension possible8.

C. Prabir Purkayastha: the UAPA

After Pankaj Bansal, a question remained: whether the rule depended on the stringent bail regime of Section 45 PMLA. In Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254, the Court applied the same requirement to arrests under the UAPA and held that non-compliance vitiates the arrest and the consequent remand. The reasoning again rested on Article 22(1), which does not distinguish between statutory regimes. The Court also confirmed that the constitutional guarantee is not diluted by the seriousness of the allegations9.

D. The gap that remained

Despite these decisions, prosecuting agencies argued that the written grounds rule belonged to special statutes with exceptional provisions, and that arrests under the ordinary penal law and the general procedural code could still be justified by an oral explanation and a panchnama. State authorities and several High Courts accepted versions of that argument. Mihir Rajesh Shah confronted it directly. It is to be noted that the Court had, shortly before, indicated in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, that the constitutional guarantee applies beyond special statutes; Mihir Rajesh Shah converts that direction into an express and operational rule10.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Universality

The Court holds that Article 22(1) is an overarching fundamental right that anchors Section 47 BNSS and that the standard of compliance does not vary with the statute under which the arrest is made. It rejects the proposition that offences under the BNS or the Motor Vehicles Act call for a lower procedural standard than the PMLA or the UAPA. The premise is that liberty under Article 21 is indivisible: an arrest under the BNS or the Motor Vehicles Act removes personal freedom as completely as an arrest under any special law. Written grounds must therefore be supplied in every case.

2. Language, timing and the narrow exception

The Court prescribes operational conditions so that the rule is not reduced to ritual. First, the grounds must be in a language the arrestee understands. If the arrestee is unlettered or unfamiliar with the language of the police station, the contents must be explained orally in a language he comprehends, and a written copy must be given in that language. Secondly, the written grounds must be supplied forthwith on arrest. Thirdly, and this is the limited concession to practical necessity, where immediate written service is not feasible because of genuine operational constraints, the grounds may be conveyed at once, and the written document must follow within a reasonable time, and in any event, at least two hours before the accused is produced before the magistrate for initial remand under Section 187 BNSS. The exception is narrow. It postpones the form of communication, but it does not dispense with the requirement, and it carries a fixed outer limit tied to the remand hearing.

3. Consequences of noncompliance

The ratio may be stated as follows: Article 22(1), read with Section 47 BNSS, requires the arresting authority to deliver the grounds of arrest in writing and in a comprehensible language, forthwith or, where exigency is shown, at least two hours before the first remand hearing. Non-compliance vitiates the arrest. Because a valid arrest is the necessary foundation of a remand order under Section 187 BNSS, a remand order made on an unlawful arrest cannot be sustained, and the accused is entitled to be set at liberty regardless of the gravity of the offence or the strength of the material collected. This follows the invalidation logic of Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha. It should be noted, however, that release on this ground does not by itself terminate the prosecution; the State remains free to proceed lawfully, and a court may still consider bail or fresh custody on a proper footing.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Article 9(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, to which India is a party, requires that anyone arrested be informed at the time of arrest of the reasons for the arrest and be promptly informed of any charges11. Principle 10 of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 1988, is to similar effect.¹⁴ The Human Rights Committee has read Article 9(2) to require that the information given be sufficient for the person to challenge the lawfulness of the detention12. A written statement in a language the person understands is the most reliable means of meeting that standard. In that sense, the judgment brings domestic procedure into line with India’s treaty commitments, although the Court reaches the result through the Constitution and not through the treaty, which is consistent with the dualist approach of Indian courts to unincorporated international obligations.

Oral communication gave the police wide latitude. A station diary entry stating that the grounds were “explained verbally” was almost impossible for an accused to contradict, and the arrest panchnama, prepared by the same agency, offered little independent assurance. A written document served on the accused changes the evidentiary position. It creates a record that the Magistrate can inspect at the first production, and it shifts the burden of explaining any omission onto the officer who made the arrest. The two-hour requirement is also well judged: it gives the accused and his counsel a minimum window to read the grounds and prepare an opposition to custody before the remand hearing begins.

Since Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, procedure established by law under Article 21 must be just, fair and reasonable13. A procedure that allows deprivation of liberty without a written statement of reasons is difficult to defend on that test. The Court’s approach also gives content to “grounds”: they are not a bare list of statutory sections but must set out the basic factual allegations, the time and place, and the reasons that make custody necessary. This reading links Article 22(1) with the substantive guarantee of Article 21 and strengthens Article 22(1) as an enforceable right and not a formal recital.

The most serious objection is that releasing an accused on a procedural ground in a case involving a death undermines the rights of the victim and public confidence. The Court’s answer is principled. The gravity of an offence cannot justify bypassing the constitutional procedure by which liberty is taken away; if it could, the safeguard would operate only in cases where it matters least. Justice Frankfurter’s observation in McNabb v. United States, that the history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards, captures the point.14 Strict enforcement also protects the integrity of the process against executive overreach.

There are nonetheless legitimate concerns. The judgment does not fully define how much detail suffices, which invites disputes in individual cases. The absolute language on release may produce hard outcomes where a procedural lapse is minor and the accused has suffered no prejudice. A more calibrated rule, distinguishing a complete failure to give written grounds from a defect in their content or timing, might have been preferable. Further, the stringency of the rule will be tested in remote areas and in cases involving unlettered arrestees, where producing a written document in the right language within hours is a practical challenge. These concerns concern the application of the rule and do not weaken its constitutional foundation.

CONCLUSION

Mihir Rajesh Shah completes a line of reasoning begun in Pankaj Bansal and continued in Prabir Purkayastha. By holding that written grounds of arrest are required in every criminal case, the Supreme Court affirms that the rights in Part III attach to the person arrested and not to the label of the offence. The decision sets a clear, administrable standard: written grounds, in an understood language, forthwith or at least two hours before remand.

The long-term consequences fall on two institutions. For the police, compliance requires standardised written grounds of arrest forms in the relevant regional languages, built into daily station practice, and training that teaches officers to record factual particulars and not merely statutory sections. State police departments should adopt standing orders, and supervisory officers should audit compliance, because the cost of error is now released. For the judiciary, magistrates exercising power under Section 187 BNSS can no longer treat remand as routine. Before authorising custody, a magistrate must ask for and examine proof that written grounds were served in time and in a language the accused understands, and must refuse remand where that proof is absent. If implemented in this way, the judgment gives practical effect to the promise of Articles 21 and 22(1) that procedural fairness is a condition of lawful state action.

  1. Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2025 INSC 1295. ↩︎
  2. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act 45 of 2023), ss. 105, 125(b), 238, 281, 324(4); The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act 59 of 1988), ss. 134(A), 134(B), 184, 187. ↩︎
  3. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act 46 of 2023), s. 187. ↩︎
  4. The Constitution of India, art 22(1). ↩︎
  5. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 47(1)–(2) ↩︎
  6. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 187 ↩︎
  7. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416. ↩︎
  8. Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576; The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (Act 15 of 2003), s. 19(1). ↩︎
  9. Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 ↩︎
  10. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269 ↩︎
  11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, art. 9(2). ↩︎
  12. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), paras. 24–30, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014). ↩︎
  13. (1978) 1 SCC 248. ↩︎
  14. 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) ↩︎