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Towards a National Crowd Safety Act: Reforming India’s Legal Framework for Mass Gatherings

About The Author

Ajin John Mathew is currently pursuing his Master of Laws (LL.M) at Government Law College, Ernakulam, and is in his fourth semester.

Introduction

Legal Status of Individual rights are undervalued when a mob is formed. Crowd gatherings in India reflect its pluralistic culture and democratic ethos. From the Kumbh Mela to political rallies and film parades, such events signify civic participation. Yet, they expose deep structural weaknesses in public safety governance. The National Crime Records Bureau reports more than 3,000 deaths due to stampedes from 2001–2022 1. Recent tragedies such as Hathras (121 deaths, 2024)2, Bengaluru RCB parade (11 deaths, 2025)3, and Karur rally (40 deaths, 2025)4 demonstrate recurring failures in risk assessment and coordination.
Despite the constitutional right to life and peaceful assembly, India’s preventive legal mechanisms remain underdeveloped. This article contends that the State’s obligation under Article 21 extends beyond post-disaster relief to proactive crowd-safety assurance.

Fragmented Legal Framework

The legal regime for crowd management is dispersed across multiple enactments.

(a) Constitutional Duties

Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal safety, while Article 19(1)(b) secures the right to assemble peacefully. The Supreme Court in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi 5 held that the right to life includes the right to live with dignity and safety. The right to life is not about mere animal existence or just physical survival but a life that must be greeted with dignity one cannot arbitrarily take away the right of another person. When the State permits large congregations, its failure to prevent foreseeable harm constitutes a constitutional wrong. Similarly, in Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand 6, administrative inaction causing hazards was deemed violative of Article 21.

(b) Criminal Law

Sections 304-A (106(1) in BNS) and 336–338 (125 – 125(b) in BNS) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 7 criminalise rash or negligent acts endangering life. However, these provisions operate post-facto and do not impose preventive obligations. Convictions remain rare due to the requirement of direct causation. The absence of statutory safety standards renders enforcement discretionary rather than deterrent.

(c) Disaster Management Act, 2005

Section 2(d) defines “disaster” broadly enough to include human-induced catastrophes 8. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) issued Guidelines on Managing Crowds at Events and Venues of Mass Gathering in 2014 9, prescribing risk assessments, venue audits, and evacuation protocols. Yet these guidelines lack statutory force, leading to inconsistent compliance across states.

(d) Police and Local Laws

Under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861, district magistrates may regulate assemblies 10, but no uniform standards for crowd density or venue safety exist. Municipal and fire-safety laws address permanent structures, not temporary venues common in religious or political gatherings 11. The result is overlapping jurisdictions and unclear accountability.

Case Studies: Administrative Negligence and Legal Vacuum

  1. Hathras Satsang (2024) – Over 250,000 devotees attended a prayer meet approved for 80,000 12. The inquiry blamed “administrative negligence” but relied only on Section 304-A IPC for prosecution 13. No enforceable safety norms existed despite NDMA recommendations.
  2. Tirumala Temple (2025) – Six deaths during Vaikunta Darshanam exposed lack of crowd-flow mapping 14. The temple board’s autonomy under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1987 15 insulated it from statutory scrutiny.
  3. Karur Political Rally (2025) – Forty deaths at a political event where crowd limits were exceeded 16. Organisers faced minimal liability, revealing impunity for politically linked-entities.
    Each incident reflects the same pathology: weak preventive law, blurred accountability, and the absence of enforceable standards.

Doctrinal and Policy Gaps

(a) Diffused Responsibility

Crowd safety presently involves multiple agencies—police, municipal bodies, and disaster authorities—without a coordinating statute. Each operates within distinct legal mandates, causing administrative overlap and jurisdictional ambiguity.

(b) Absence of Preventive Duties

Existing criminal provisions punish negligence only after death or injury. There is no statutory obligation to conduct safety audits, classify risk levels, or obtain crowd-safety licences. Preventive governance is replaced by reactive blame.

(c) Non-binding Nature of Guidelines

NDMA guidelines, being administrative in nature, are not justiciable. Courts have treated them as recommendatory rather than mandatory 17. Thus, victims of non-compliance have no enforceable remedy.

(d) Undefined Organiser Liability

Neither the IPC nor civil law defines the duty of care owed by organisers. The Donoghue v. Stevenson principle of foreseeability 18 has not been codified in the Indian context. Singapore’s Public Order Act, 2009 19, by contrast, mandates organisers to file safety plans and imposes command-level accountability.

(e) Religious and Cultural Exemptions

Religious gatherings, the most casualty-prone, often claim exemption under Article 25. However, in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shirur Mutt 20, the Supreme Court clarified that religious freedom is subject to public order and morality. Exemptions thus undermine equality before law under Article 14.

(f) Reactive Governance

India’s “post-tragedy syndrome”—reform following disaster—contradicts the constitutional principle of due diligence. The continuing failure to enact a preventive statute amount to a breach of Article 21, as recognised in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa21.

Comparative Perspectives

(a) United Kingdom

After the 1989 Hillsborough Disaster, the UK enacted the Safety of Sports Grounds Act, 1975 and Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act, 1987, 22 mandating safety certification and maximum-capacity licensing. The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds (Green Guide) 23 operationalises risk management through independent audits.

(b) Singapore

The Public Order Act, 2009 requires a police licence for all assemblies and imposes criminal penalties for safety violations 24. Real-time crowd monitoring by the Home Team Science and Technology Agency ensures preventive enforcement.

(c) Japan

The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, 1961 integrates crowd safety within disaster management 25. Local committees conduct drills and employ AI-based analytics for crowd prediction.

(d) Australia

The Work Health and Safety Act, 2011 26 extends a duty of care to event organisers, establishing both civil and criminal liability for breach. These jurisdictions demonstrate that statutory codification, not discretionary circulars, prevents mass casualties.

Proposal: The National Crowd Safety Act (NCSA)

A dedicated statute must unify preventive, administrative, and accountability frameworks.

1. Objectives

  • Safeguard the right to life (Article 21) and peaceful assembly (Article 19(1)(b));
  • Define statutory duties for organisers and authorities;
  • Mandate risk-based licensing and certification;
  • Institutionalise coordination across agencies.

2. Institutional Design

Establish a National Crowd Safety Authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs with powers to:

  • Frame model safety standards;
  • Certify safety auditors;
  • Maintain a national crowd-event database.

Each state should form State and District Crowd Safety Committees for licensing, audits, and inter-agency coordination.

3. Event Licensing

Events exceeding 5,000 attendees should require a Crowd Safety Licence, issued only after submission of a Comprehensive Crowd Safety Plan (CCSP) and independent audit. Unlicensed large events must attract penal sanctions.

4. Organiser and Official Liability

Organisers should bear strict liability for safety breaches, with imprisonment up to seven years in fatal incidents. Officials granting permissions in violation of norms must face criminal proceedings under Section 166 IPC. Mandatory event insurance should provide immediate victim compensation.

5. Inclusion and Transparency

Religious and political gatherings must fall within the Act’s ambit. All safety plans, audit reports, and post-event evaluations should be uploaded to a public digital portal to ensure transparency and research access.

Implementation Roadmap

Phase I (Year 1): Parliamentary enactment, formation of authorities, framing of model rules.
Phase II (Years 2–3): Training 10,000 safety auditors; pilot implementation at major venues like Kumbh Mela and Tirumala.
Phase III (Years 4–5): Full enforcement, AI-based monitoring, and annual National Crowd Safety Report.
Such codification would harmonise fragmented laws, institutionalise preventive culture, and embed constitutional accountability.

 Conclusion

India’s recurring crowd disasters expose a grave constitutional paradox: the State guarantees the right to life but lacks the law to protect it in public gatherings. A National Crowd Safety Act would transform reactive administration into proactive governance. By drawing on comparative models—the UK’s certification system, Singapore’s command responsibility, Japan’s integration, and Australia’s duty of care—India can anchor public safety in enforceable law.
As Justice P. N. Bhagwati observed, “Life is not mere animal existence but a meaningful, dignified life.” 27 Ensuring that citizens can assemble without fear of death is essential to that dignity. Legal codification is thus not a bureaucratic formality—it is a constitutional necessity.

Footnote

  1. National Crime Records Bureau, Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India 2022 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2023). ↩︎
  2. ‘India Suspends Six Officials after Hathras Stampede’, Reuters, 9 July 2024. ↩︎
  3. Bengaluru Stampede Claims 11 Lives’, Times of India, 5 June 2025. ↩︎
  4. Karur Rally Stampede Kills 40’, Reuters, 28 September 2025. ↩︎
  5. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746. ↩︎
  6. Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand, (1980) 4 SCC 162. ↩︎
  7. Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss. 304-A, 336–338. ↩︎
  8. Disaster Management Act, 2005, s. 2(d). ↩︎
  9. National Disaster Management Authority, Guidelines on Managing Crowds at Events and Venues of Mass Gathering (2014). ↩︎
  10. Police Act, 1861, s. 30. ↩︎
  11. Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, s. 430. ↩︎
  12. ‘Hathras Tragedy Inquiry Report’, Hindustan Times, July 2024. ↩︎
  13. Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 304-A. ↩︎
  14. ‘Six Dead in Tirumala Stampede’, The Hindu, 9 January 2025. ↩︎
  15. Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1987. ↩︎
  16. ‘Karur Rally Stampede Kills 40’, Reuters, 28 September 2025 ↩︎
  17. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574. ↩︎
  18. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 (HL). ↩︎
  19. Public Order Act, 2009 (Singapore), ss. 7–12 ↩︎
  20. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282. ↩︎
  21. Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 ↩︎
  22. Safety of Sports Grounds Act, 1975 (UK); Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act, 1987 (UK). ↩︎
  23. UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, 6th ed., 2018 ↩︎
  24.  Public Order Act, 2009 (Singapore). ↩︎
  25. Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, 1961 (Japan). ↩︎
  26. Work Health and Safety Act, 2011 (Australia). ↩︎
  27. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746. ↩︎

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